Canada’s upcoming nuclear expansion will see its first reactors relying on foreign sources for fuel enrichment and fabrication, despite Prime Minister Mark Carney’s emphasis on Canadian energy autonomy. This shift marks a departure from Canada’s historical reliance on domestic nuclear supply chains through the Candu reactor system. Ontario is in the process of constructing the initial BWRX-300 small modular reactors (SMRs) at the Darlington New Nuclear Project in Clarington, Ont., in collaboration with American and Japanese partners. These new reactors will operate on low-enriched uranium, a contrast to Candu reactors using domestically produced natural uranium without enrichment.
Ontario Power Generation (OPG) plans to have the first BWRX-300 reactor at Darlington connected to the grid by the end of 2030, with three more expected in the mid-2030s. The uranium ore will be mined in Saskatchewan by Cameco and then processed in Port Hope, Ont., before being enriched in the United States. Enriched uranium suppliers also include France’s Orano and Britain’s Urenco, while an American company will handle the final assembly of the fuel.
This new approach has raised concerns among experts, as it diverges from the original principles of Canada’s nuclear program. The reliance on foreign sources for enriched uranium introduces potential geopolitical risks, as foreign entities could disrupt the nuclear fuel supply during political disputes. While OPG asserts that involving multiple suppliers creates a robust supply chain, the enrichment and fabrication processes will remain in foreign control.
Ontario’s decision to opt for a foreign reactor stems from the absence of a viable Canadian alternative capable of generating electricity on the required scale. The American-Japanese BWRX-300 was selected for its advanced technology and reduced risks associated with constructing a unique reactor. The Candu Monark, a domestic reactor under development in Canada, did not meet the criteria for Ontario’s SMR project.
Despite efforts to mitigate supply risks by engaging with suppliers from the United States, France, and Britain, the dependence on foreign enrichment remains a concern. The federal government downplays the supply risk associated with foreign enrichment in the short to medium-term, emphasizing the small quantity of enriched fuel needed for the Darlington SMRs.
While SMRs offer certain advantages, such as reduced machinery requirements and potential cost savings through shared infrastructure, concerns persist regarding their economic viability compared to larger reactors. Canada’s potential to establish its own uranium-enrichment industry could eliminate dependence on foreign suppliers, but the significant costs and security implications pose challenges.
Ontario remains the sole province committed to SMR development, with other provinces like Saskatchewan, New Brunswick, and Alberta exploring nuclear projects that may involve SMRs. The shift towards new reactor technologies raises questions about long-term liabilities, including the management of nuclear waste from the emerging fleet of reactors.